

or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States signs the CTBT.

Our efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The U.S. also has made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear forces. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to contribute to the deterrence of certain kinds of attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. A lack of confidence in that deterrent might itself result in the spread of nuclear weapons.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to ensure that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent through an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation, and other experiments. We support this kind of scientific and analytic effort. But even with adequate funding—which is far from assured—the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable alternative to testing.

Given the absence of any pressing reason for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future Presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge you to reach an understanding with the President to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

Sincerely,

BRENT SCOWCROFT.  
HENRY A. KISSINGER.  
JOHN DEUTCH.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today I attended an event in the White House at which 31 Nobel laureates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four previous chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, among many others, supported the ratification by the Senate of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The point was made in those presentations that this treaty is not about politics. It is not about political par-

ties. It is about the issue of the proliferation or spread of nuclear weapons and whether the United States of America should ratify a treaty signed by the President and sent to the Senate over 700 days ago that calls for a ban on all further testing of nuclear weapons all around the world.

For some months, I have been coming to the floor of the Senate suggesting that after nearly 2 years we ought to be debating the question of whether this country should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I have exhibited charts that have shown the Senate what has happened with respect to other treaties that have been sent to the Senate by various Presidents, how long it has taken for them to be considered, the conditions under which they were considered, and I have made the point that this treaty alone has languished for over 2 years without hearings and without discussion. Why? Because there are some in the Senate who oppose it and don't want it to be debated or voted upon.

There are small issues and big issues in the course of events in the Senate. We spent many hours over a period of days debating whether to change the name of Washington's National Airport. What a debate that was—whether to change the name of Washington National Airport. That was a small issue. It was proposed that former President Reagan's name be put on that airport. Some agreed, some disagreed. We had a vote, after a debate over a number of days. The naming of an airport, in my judgment, is a small issue.

An example of a big issue is whether we are going to do something as a country to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Now a big issue comes to the floor of the Senate in the form of a request for ratification of a treaty called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is not a new idea, not a new issue. It started with President Dwight Eisenhower believing we ought to exhibit the leadership to see if we could stop all the testing of nuclear weapons around the rest of the world. It has taken over 40 years. Actually, 7 years ago this country took unilateral action and said: We are going to stop testing. We, the United States, will no longer test nuclear weapons. So we took the lead, and we decided 7 years ago we would not any longer test nuclear weapons.

The treaty that is now before the Senate, that was negotiated with many other countries around the world in the last 5 years and sent to the Senate over 2 years ago, is a treaty that answers the question: Will other countries do what we have done? Will we be able to persuade other countries to decide not to test nuclear weapons?

Why is that important? Because no country that has nuclear weapons can acquire more advanced weaponry without testing. And no country that does not now have nuclear weapons can ac-

quire nuclear weapons with any assurance they have nuclear weapons that work without testing. Prohibit testing, stop the testing of nuclear weapons, and you take a step in the direction of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons around this world.

We have some 30,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of Russia and the United States. We have other countries that possess nuclear weapons. We have still other countries that want to possess nuclear weapons. We have a world that is a dangerous world with respect to the potential spread of nuclear weapons. The question is, what shall we do about that? What kind of behavior, what kind of response in this country, is appropriate to deal with that question?

Some say the response is to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I believe that. I believe that very strongly. Others say this treaty will weaken our country, that this treaty is not good for our country, this treaty will sacrifice our security. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nothing. Some say that—not all—have never supported any arms control agreements, never liked them. I understand that, despite the fact those people have been wrong.

Arms control agreements have worked. Actually, agreements that we have reached through the ratification of treaties have resulted in the reduction of nuclear warheads, the reduction of delivery vehicles. Some arms control treaties have worked. However, there are some who have not supported any of those treaties. I guess they are content to believe it is their job to oppose treaties. There are others who have supported previous treaties who somehow believe this treaty is inappropriate. Perhaps they read a newspaper article last week that said there are new appraisals or new assessments by the CIA that suggest it would be difficult for us to monitor low-level nuclear tests. That article was wrong. The article in the newspaper that said the CIA has a new assessment or a new report is wrong. The CIA has no new assessment. The CIA has no new reports. I have talked to the Director of the CIA. No such report and no such assessment exists.

Do we have difficulty detecting low-level nuclear explosions, very low-level nuclear explosions? The answer is yes. But then, the answer is also: Yes; so what? Will the ability to detect those kinds of small explosions—explosions which, by the way, don't give anyone any enhanced capability in nuclear power or nuclear weaponry—will we be able to better detect those and better monitor those if we pass this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? The answer to that is an unqualified yes.

I have a chart to demonstrate what I mean. This chart shows the current monitoring network by which we attempt to monitor where nuclear tests may have occurred in the world. This bottom chart shows current monitoring. The top chart shows monitoring

that will occur after we have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in place. Is there anyone who can argue that having this enhanced monitoring in place will not enhance our capability of detecting nuclear weapons tests? Of course it will. That is why every senior military officer in this country who has been involved in this—from the Joint Chiefs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the other senior officers—have said passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is good for this country and will not jeopardize this country's security. They know and we know it will enhance this country's ability to detect nuclear tests anywhere around the world.

It baffles me that on an issue this big and this important, we have people who seem to not want to understand and debate the facts. I mentioned I have been on the floor for some months pushing for consideration of this treaty. Probably partly as a result of that, probably partly as a result of a letter that all 45 Members of the Democratic caucus sent to the majority leader saying we think the Senate ought to consider this treaty, we ought to have hearings, about a week ago the majority leader abruptly decided, all right, we will consider this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; we will consider it by having a vote in a matter of 10 days or so.

We had held no hearings. This has not been a thoughtful process of consideration. We have not held comprehensive hearings; we have sparked no national debate. We will just go to a vote—as far as I am concerned, that is not a very responsible thing to do, but I won't object to that—go to a vote if that is what you want to do.

It is very interesting how those in this Chamber treat the light seriously and treat the serious lightly. If ever there was a case of treating serious issues lightly, it is this. We have a treaty dealing with the banning of nuclear testing in this world, negotiated and signed by 145 countries, languishing here for 2 years, and now in 10 days let's have a vote—and, by the way, we don't intend on having significant hearings.

The Senator from Virginia indicated he will have hearings. I applaud him for that. He is a thoughtful Senator, in my judgment; I respect him deeply. He disagrees with me on this issue. I have deep respect for him. I think it is appropriate there are hearings being held this week. I think they probably thought—some thought—you can't call this up for a vote without at least showing you will have some hearings. I am told the requests to have people testify at the hearings who support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was not met with great success. Who knows; we will see the record of that, I suppose, toward the end of the week.

Let me show what our allies have done with respect to this treaty. We spent a lot of time on the floor of the Senate talking about NATO. We have

been involved with NATO, in Kosovo and elsewhere. In fact, the Senate voted to expand NATO. NATO is an important security alliance. What have our NATO allies done with respect to this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Most of them have already ratified it. Two of the NATO nuclear powers have ratified the treaty, England and France. NATO itself endorsed the treaty at the April 1999 conference. The United States has yet to ratify it. Some would say: Neither have China and Russia. Of course they are not NATO members. Neither have China nor Russia. That is true, they have not. They will, in my judgment, when this country ratifies it. They did when this country ratified the chemical weapons treaty.

My point is this: I think this country has a responsibility to provide leadership, moral leadership, on an issue this important. Are there questions that can be raised about this treaty? Yes. And every single one of them can be answered easily and decisively, every one. There is not a question that has been raised that casts a shred of doubt on what the outcome ought to be on the vote in this Senate on this treaty. If you believe this country has a responsibility to provide leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the threat of nuclear war, then this Senate ought to ratify this treaty.

Perhaps it would be useful to quote President Kennedy who succeeded President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower, 40 years ago, said:

One of greatest regrets of any administration of any time would be the failure to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty.

President Kennedy, following President Eisenhower's lead, said the following:

A comprehensive test ban would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards man faces. It would increase our security. It would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on responsible safeguards.

President Johnson said:

We shall demonstrate that, despite all his problems, quarrels and distractions, man still retains a capacity to design his fate rather than be engulfed by it. Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience in a world that needs all of its resources and talents to serve life, not death.

When Nikita Khrushchev, in discussions and dialog with President Kennedy, described nuclear war as "a circumstance in which the living would envy the dead," that was almost 40 years ago, long, long ago, before we had arsenals of 30,000 nuclear weapons, some in airplanes, some on submarines, some on missiles, some in storage facilities, with many countries around the world wanting to achieve the opportunity to possess nuclear weapons.

We have very few opportunities to do work as important as will be done if

the Senate ratifies this treaty. My expectation is that when we debate this treaty in the coming couple of days—the schedule is for a debate Friday and a debate the following Tuesday—at the culmination of 14 hours, we would discuss the advisability of the Senate ratifying this treaty. There will be a lot of discussion by those who believe it is ill advised and by those who believe it is imperative the Senate ratify this treaty.

Let me make a couple of other comments that might describe some of this debate. The debate will not be about the American people's interests. According to surveys, 82 percent of the American people support a comprehensive nuclear test ban—82 percent of the American people. The debate, in my judgment, will not be about espionage by the Chinese. Some have said the Chinese espionage allegations at National Laboratories actually weaken the case for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In fact the Cox report, which was published earlier this year, pointed out that if China were a signatory to and were to adhere to the CTBT, its ability to modernize its nuclear arsenal would be significantly curtailed.

Let me put up the chart of the monitoring stations. After we ratify the treaty, let me ask if anyone in this Chamber could make the argument that we have less capability to monitor than we do now? No one can make that case. We will have more capability. And no one can make the case there is some new assessment or new report by the CIA that poses a danger, saying we can't detect tests of nuclear explosions. That is not accurate either. Despite the story in the newspaper, the CIA says there is no new assessment. The CIA says there is no new report.

Can we detect low-level explosions that have no consequence in the development of advanced weapons or the acquisition of nuclear weapons? The answer is no; we cannot detect those low-level explosions. And the response is, so what? So what? We could not 4 years ago; we cannot now. Have our abilities to detect been enhanced in the last few years? The answer is yes. But we will hear those charges nonetheless. I think it is important for people to understand the charges are without merit.

Today at the White House, 31 Nobel laureates were in attendance. These are those honored physicists and chemists who have won the highest awards, who have powerful intellects, the scientists who understand and evaluate these issues. One of those scientists who spoke today is Dr. Charles Townes. He is the man who invented radar during the Second World War for our airplanes, and the laser—a towering intellect. He spoke with passion about the need for this country to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

These scientists almost uniformly indicate they have no questions about our ability to detect explosions of consequence. They have no questions

about our ability to require compliance with this treaty and detect cheating. In the front row of that meeting at the White House today were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General Shelton, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Gen. David Jones, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Admiral Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—all of them were there to support this treaty.

Why? Because it weakens this country? No; of course that's absurd. It does not weaken this country. They were there because they know it strengthens this country. They know, from a security standpoint and from a military standpoint, the ratification of this treaty strengthens this country.

I know I have heard about briefings that are held which suggest that there is information that is not available to the American people that suggests something different. It is not the case. It is just not the case. I am sorry. I respect those who disagree with me. They are welcome to come to the floor of the Senate, and will, and they will debate. I am sure they will be persuasive, in their own way. But I am telling you in my judgment, there is nothing, there is nothing that would persuade the last four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Gen. Colin Powell, to support the ratification of this test ban treaty if they felt this treaty would injure this country.

Does anyone in this Chamber believe that Gen. Colin Powell is advocating ratification of a treaty that will weaken this country? If so, come and tell us that. Or perhaps we will have people come and say Gen. Colin Powell doesn't understand. Or, if he understands, he is misinformed. I don't think so. Not General Powell, not General Shalikashvili, not General Jones, not Admiral Crowe, and not General Shelton. All of them come to the same conclusion: This treaty will strengthen our country. The ratification of this treaty will strengthen the security of this country. The ratification of this treaty will allow us to better monitor whether anyone cheats on a treaty that is designed to ban nuclear testing.

Again, there is room for disagreement, but in my judgment there is not room for the Senate to say to the world: We quit testing in 1992 unilaterally, and our position is we quit testing, but anyone else out there, our message is: You go ahead; we do not want to impose the same limitation on you; we have quit testing nuclear weapons, but we do not want to impose the limitation on you.

We have two countries that have nuclear capability: India and Pakistan. They do not like each other much, and they are neighbors. They share a contentious border. Earlier this year, they each exploded a nuclear weapon literally under each other's chin. That should provide a sober warning to the rest of this world that we need to stop nuclear testing and need a ban on nu-

clear testing, especially to the Senate, a senate in a country that possesses the best capability of leadership in the entire world on this issue. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the willingness to use them, the willingness to test them, is a very serious issue. It is a big issue, and this Senate has a responsibility to address it.

It would be unthinkable for me to see this Senate proceed in the manner it now appears to be proceeding, and that is to take an issue this important and to blithely say: All right, it's been here 2 years; we have not cared much about it, and a week from Tuesday, we will bring it up and kill it because we do not believe in arms control; if you don't like that, that's tough luck.

That is not a responsible way to legislate. I did not object to bringing it up on Tuesday. There was a unanimous consent request. I did not object to it. If that is the only way to get a vote, as far as I am concerned, so be it. But it is not a responsible way to legislate. All of us know better than that. We know better on issues this important that the way to legislate is to take a treaty that has been signed by 154 countries, and have a series of hearings. We should have men and women across this country weigh in on this issue, have a robust, aggressive, thoughtful, interesting, exciting debate, and then the Senate should vote. That is not what has happened here. We know that.

Two years have passed, and this treaty has been in prison. This treaty has not seen the light of day. I know we had a Senator saying that is not true, there have been hearings. Senator BIDEN came to the floor to refute that. There have been no hearings. This week, there have been a couple of hearings. The Senator from Virginia just talked about hearings. He is a man for whom I have great respect. I only regret he is on the other side of this issue.

Everyone in this Chamber knows better than to proceed with this issue in this manner. This has great consequences all around the world. This country has a responsibility all around the world. Everybody in this Chamber knows better. That is not the way you handle a treaty of this importance, by standing up and saying: If you want a treaty, then let's do it in 10 days, and if you don't like it, tough luck.

If that is the only opportunity presented to the Senate to decide we are going to lead the world in arms control and say to the rest of the world we have quit testing nuclear weapons and we want you to as well, we are going to ratify the treaty, that is fine.

If there are those who stand up and say: We do not support a ban on nuclear testing; in fact, we ought to test more; we do not want to send a signal to India and Pakistan not to test; we do not want to send a message to Russia and China to ratify the pact, they can say that. That is the democratic way. But they will not say it with my

vote. It is the wrong direction for this country. It is not leadership. It is an abdication of leadership, in my judgment. I hope in the coming days we will find a way to see if we cannot have a more thoughtful approach to this country doing what it ought to do.

I want to conclude with one additional chart that has some quotes which I think are important. This is the Joint Chiefs of Staff Annual Posture Statement 1999, responding to the question raised by those in the Senate who say the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will injure this country's preparedness and security. Nonsense. It says:

In a very real sense, one of the best ways to protect our troops and our interests is to promote arms control. . . . In both the conventional and nuclear realms, arms control can reduce the chances of conflict. . . . Our efforts to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons coincide with efforts to control testing of nuclear weapons . . . and the Joint Chiefs support ratification of this treaty.

I want to hear in this debate from those who believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, heading the military services in our country, have somehow concluded they want to support something that injures this country's defense. It is preposterous. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support this because they understand it will enhance this country's defense; it will make this country and this world more secure.

Gen. Colin Powell, General Shalikashvili, Adm. William Crowe, and Gen. David Jones said the following:

We support Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty together with six safeguards under which the President will be prepared to conduct necessary testing if the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be verified.

This treaty has safeguards. Gen. Colin Powell says he supports this treaty. It will not injure this country's security or preparedness. I do not think we have to go further on the floor of the Senate. We can have folks come over here and raise their fists, get red in the face, the veins in their necks can bulge, they can hyperventilate, and they can speak loudly about their vision of what this might or might not do with respect to this country's military preparedness. But when they are done, I will ask them to go visit with Colin Powell, I will ask them to visit with General Shelton or the Joint Chiefs of Staff and try to reconcile the position the military leaders in this country have taken with respect to this treaty to the allegations made without a good basis on the floor of the Senate about this treaty.

We are given 14 hours, starting Friday and continuing Tuesday, to debate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If that is the procedure for debate that exists at the end of this week, then I will be here, and I intend to speak at some length, as will my colleagues, Senator BIDEN and many others, who feel strongly about this.

I look forward to engaging in this debate. I know there are some who are concerned, upset, and nervous about heading toward a vote that looks as if we probably will lose. But I say this: At least we are on the right subject for a change. At least we are talking about the right issue for a change. If talking about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty takes goading the majority into saying to us: We are going to give you 10 days with no hearings, essentially, and then we are going to force you to vote and defeat this treaty because that is what we want to tell the world about our position on nuclear weapons and arms control, that is fine with me because we are talking about the right subject.

If we do not ratify this treaty now, we will ratify it next year, and if we do not ratify it next year, then we will ratify it the year after. Because at some point, when 82 percent of the American people want arms control to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons through the ratification of this treaty, and when the Joint Chiefs of Staff say it will not injure the security of this country, at some point the American people will say: We want to have our way on this issue, and we will impress our way on this issue by having the Senate come to this Chamber and vote for ratification. If not now, later. But at some point, the American people will demand this country provide leadership in reducing the threat of nuclear war and reducing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Senator from Virginia, Mr. WARNER, is on the floor. I mentioned a couple of times—I did not mention his name—but I referred to him as “the Senator from Virginia.”

I say to Senator WARNER, I mentioned—when I think you were not on the floor—one of my great regrets is that you are not with us on this issue because I have great respect for you and your abilities. I also appreciate the fact that some hearings are being held this week.

But I confess, as I have said, I think this is not a good, thoughtful way to deal with something this important. I am not talking about the Senator's hearings. I am talking about, after 2 years of virtually no activity, saying: All right. Ten days from now we're going to have a vote. In the meantime, we'll cobble together a couple hearings and then figure how we get there, and vote the treaty down, and tell the world that is our judgment.

I do not think that is a good way to do it. I think that is treating the serious too lightly. I do not think it is the best we can do. The better way for us to have done this, in my judgment, is to have decided we would hold a comprehensive set of hearings over a rather lengthy period of time, develop a national discussion about the import and consequence of a treaty of this type, and then have the Senate consider it. That is not what is being done.

If we vote next Tuesday, I am here and I am ready. I am ready Friday and

Tuesday to debate it. But I very much wish this had been dealt with in a much more responsible way. By that comment, I do not mean to suggest the Senator from Virginia is in any way involved in that. I, again, appreciate the fact that he is holding some hearings this week, hearing from people who are weighing in on both sides of this issue.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I simply say to my good friend and colleague that I addressed many of the issues he has addressed in the last few minutes in a press conference today that I think covers the work of the Armed Services Committee.

We are trying to do a very thorough job. We have had 10 hours of hearings in the last 48 hours. We will go into lengthy hearings again tomorrow morning.

I thank my friend for his views.

#### HIGH DENSITY RULE

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, although I have serious reservations with respect to one or two provisions, I rise in support of the amendment by Senators GORTON and ROCKEFELLER to replace the slot-related provisions in the bill.

It won't surprise anyone to hear that my reservations primarily concern Reagan National. It is deeply regrettable that the amendment takes a step backward in terms of competitive access to Reagan National. The Commerce Committee overwhelmingly approved providing 48 slot exemptions for more service. This amendment will cut that number in half. I understand that this bill may not have come to the floor if this compromise had not been made, but I certainly am not happy about it. Nevertheless, some additional access is better than none at all.

The most frustrating aspect of this compromise is that the continued existence of slot and perimeter restrictions at Reagan National flies in the face of every independent analysis of the situation. To support my position, I can quote at length from reports by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the National Research Council, and others, all of which conclude that slots and perimeter rules are anticompetitive, unfair, uneeded, and harmful to consumers. Despite the voluminous support for the fact that these restrictions are bad public policy, we allow them to continue.

Reagan National should not receive special treatment just because it is located inside the Beltway. This amendment will already lead to the eventual elimination of the high density rule at O'Hare, Kennedy, and LaGuardia. If we believe it is good policy at those airports, why is it not the same for Reagan National? Arguments that opening up the airport to more service and competition will harm safety, exceed capacity, or adversely affect other

airports in the region are without merit. The GAO recently concluded that the proposals in the committee-reported bill are well within capacity limits and would not significantly impact nearby airports. In addition, the DOT believes that increased flights would not be a safety risk.

With any luck, the wisdom and benefits of increasing airline competition will eventually win out over narrow parochial interests. It saddens me to say that it will not happen today. Another opportunity to do the right thing by the traveling public is being missed.

But my concerns about the Reagan National provisions do not in any way diminish my enthusiastic support for the other competition enhancing provisions in the bill. Eliminating the slot controls at the other restricted airports is a remarkable win for the principle of competition and for consumers. As GAO and others have repeatedly found, more competition leads to lower fares and better service. And in the interim, new entrants and small communities will benefit from enhanced access, which is good news.

I want to make our intent clear with respect to the provisions that govern the time period before the slot restrictions are lifted. We are providing additional access for new service to small communities and for new entrants and limited incumbent airlines. Because these airports are already dominated by the major airlines, which jealously hold on to slots to keep competitors out, we intentionally limited their ability to take advantage of the new opportunities.

The amendment directs that Secretary of Transportation to treat commuter affiliates of the major airlines the same, for purposes of applying for slot exemptions and for gaining interim access to O'Hare. Let me be perfectly clear about what this provision means. It means the Secretary should consider commuter affiliates as new entrants or limited incumbents for purposes of applying for slot exemptions and interim access to O'Hare. A major airline should not be allowed to game the system and add to its hundreds of daily slots through its commuter affiliates and codeshare partners. Genuine new entrants and limited incumbents are startup airlines that cannot get competitive access to the high density markets.

Many provisions in this amendment are just as that Senate approved them in last year's bill, so I will forgo a discussion of the various studies and other requirements that ensure people residing around these airports have their concerns addressed. Suffice it to say that the FAA and DOT will be very busy monitoring conditions in and around the four affected airports over the next few years. If these provisions begin having seriously adverse impacts, which I do not anticipate, we will certainly know about them.

The benefits of airline deregulation have been proven time and again in